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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of cross-chain payment whereby cus-
tomers of different escrows—implemented by a bank or a blockchain
smart contract—successfully transfer digital assets without trusting
each other. Prior to this work, cross-chain payment problems did
not require this success, or any form of progress. We demonstrate
that it is possible to solve this problem when assuming synchrony,
in the sense that each message is guaranteed to arrive within a
known amount of time, but impossible to solve without assuming
synchrony. Yet, we solve a weaker variant of this problem, where
success is conditional on the patience of the participants, without
assuming synchrony, and in the presence of Byzantine failures. We
also discuss the relation with the recently defined cross-chain deals.
1 INTRODUCTION AND RELATEDWORK
With the advent of various payment protocols comes the problem
of interoperability between them. A simple way for users of differ-
ent protocols to interact is to do a cross-chain payment whereby
intermediaries can help customer Alice transfer digital assets to
Bob even though Alice and Bob own accounts in different banks
or blockchains. To implement a payment between customers of
different banks, it helps if the two banks have ways to transfer
assets to each other, and moreover trust each other. The problem
becomes more interesting when this is not the case. Thomas and
Schwartz [4] propose two cross-chain payment protocols: (i) the
universal protocol requires synchrony [1]; (ii) the atomic protocol
merely requires partial synchrony [1]. Herlihy, Liskov and Shrira [3]
represent a cross-chain payment as a deal matrix M where Mi, j
characterises a transfer of some asset from participant i to partic-
ipant j. They offer a timelock protocol that requires synchrony,
and a certified blockchain protocol that requires partial synchrony.
However, the synchronous solutions of [4] and [3] do not consider
clock drift, and for their partially synchronous solutions no success
guarantees are established.
In this brief announcement, we formally define the time-bounded
cross-chain payment problem, and show that, assuming synchrony,
there exists an algorithm that solves it. Our solution is the universal
protocol of [4], but fine-tuned to work correctly in the presence
of clock drift. We also prove that this problem cannot be solved
when merely assuming partial synchrony, even if we relax the
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problem statement by merely requiring eventual (instead of time-
bounded) termination. Moreover, inspired by earlier work on the
transaction commit problem [2], we define a weaker variant of our
problem that relaxes the liveness guarantee to be solvable with
partial synchrony. Contrary to the problem statements in [4] and
[3], a protocol where all participants always abort is not permitted
by our problem specification.
2 MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We assume n banks or escrows e0, . . . , en−1 and n+1 customers
c0, . . . , cn . These 2n+1 processes are called participants. An escrow
is a specific type of process that can handle values for other par-
ties in a predefined manner. Customer c0 is Alice and cn is Bob.
The customers c1, . . . , cn−1 are intermediaries in the interaction
between Alice and Bob; we call them connectors, named Chloei .
Customers ci−1 and ci have accounts at escrow ei−1, and trust this
escrow (i = 1, . . . ,n). We do not assume any other relations of trust.
c0
e0
c1
e1
. . . cn−1
en−1
cn
Figure 1: Customers and escrows.
We assume that value can be transferred directly only between
customers of the same escrow. Moreover, any transfer between two
customers of an escrow can be modelled as two transfers: one from
the originating customer to the escrow, and one from the escrow
to the receiving customer. Thus, the connections from Figure 1
describe both the relations of trust and the possible transfers.
Two customers may make a deal with an escrow to place value
from the first customer “in escrow”, and, after a predefined period,
depending onwhich conditions aremet, either complete the transfer
to the second customer, or return the value to the first one.
We suppose that the participants have already agreed upon the
value they expect to transfer. As Chloe helps out transferring value
from Alice to Bob, it is only reasonable that she is paid a small com-
mission. Hence the value transferred from Alice to Chloe might be
larger than the value transferred from Chloe to Bob. Additionally,
these values may be expressed in different currencies, or they may
be objects. Deciding which values to transfer may thus be an in-
teresting problem. However, it is entirely orthogonal to the matter
discussed here, and hence we shall not consider it any further.
We consider the classic Byzantine model with authentication.
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3 FEASIBILITY OF CROSS-CHAIN PAYMENTS
A cross-chain payment protocol prescribes a behaviour for each
of the participants in the protocol, the escrows and the customers.
Let χ be a certificate signed by Bob saying that Alice’s obligation
to pay him has been met.
Definition 1. A protocol is a time-bounded cross-chain pay-
ment protocol (resp. an eventually terminating cross-chain pay-
ment protocol) if it satisfies the following properties:
C Consistency. For each participant in the protocol it is
possible to abide by the protocol.
T Time-bounded (resp. eventual) termination. Each
customer that abides by the protocol, and either makes
a payment or issues a certificate, terminates within an
a priori known period (resp. terminates eventually),
provided her escrows abide by the protocol.
ES Escrow security. Each escrow that abides by the pro-
tocol does not lose money.
CS Customer security.
CS1 Upon termination, if Alice and her escrow abide by
the protocol, Alice has either got her money back or
received the certificate χ .
CS2 Upon termination, if Bob and his escrow abide by
the protocol, Bob has either received the money or
not issued certificate χ .
CS3 Upon termination, each connector that abides by
the protocol has got her money back, provided her
escrows abide by the protocol.
L Strong liveness. If all parties abide by the protocol,
Bob is paid eventually.
Requirement C (consistency of the protocol) is essential. In the
absence of this requirement, any protocol that prescribes an im-
possible task for each participant would be a correct cross-chain
payment protocol (since it trivially meets T, ES, CS and L).
Requirements ES and CS (the safety properties) say that if a
participant abides by the protocol, nothing really bad can happen
to her. These requirements do not assume that any other participant
abides by the protocol, and should hold no matter how malicious
the other participants turn out to be. The only exception to that is
that the safety properties for a customer (CS) are guaranteed only
when the escrow(s) of this customer abide by the protocol.
Property L, saying that the protocol serves its intended purpose,
is the only one that is contingent on all parties abiding by the
protocol. The proofs of the following results are presented in [5].
Theorem 1. If communications and computations are synchro-
nous, there exists a time-bounded cross-chain payment protocol.
Theorem 2. If communications are partially synchronous, there
is no eventually terminating cross-chain payment protocol.
In view of this impossibility result we propose to weaken the
liveness guarantee as indicated in Def. 2. In [5] we present a proto-
col in which each customer can, at any moment of their choice, lose
patience and abort the transaction, without a risk of losing value. In
case none of them exercises this option nor fails, a successful out-
come is guaranteed. This solution involves an external transaction
manager, that can issue an abort or commit certificate. Properties
CC and CS2 together guarantee that the commit certificate can be
used by Alice as a proof that Bob has been paid. The transaction
manager could be a single external party trusted by all, or a smart
contract running on a permissionless blockchain shared by every
customer. It can also be a collection of notaries appointed by the
participants in the protocol, of which less than one-third is assumed
to be unreliable. They would run a consensus algorithm for partial
synchrony such as the one from Dwork, Lynch & Stockmeyer [1].
Definition 2. A protocol is a cross-chain payment protocol
with weak liveness guarantees if it satisfies properties C, ES
and CS3, as well as:
CC Certificate consistency. An abort and a commit cer-
tificate can never be issued both.
T Termination. Each customer that abides by the proto-
col terminates eventually, provided her escrows abide
by the protocol.
CS Customer security.
CS1 Upon termination, if Alice and her escrow abide by
the protocol, Alice has either got her money back or
received the commit certificate χc .
CS2 Upon termination, if Bob and his escrow abide by
the protocol, Bob has either received the money or
the abort certificate χa .
L Weak liveness. If all parties abide by the protocol and
if the customers wait sufficiently long before and after
sending money, then Bob is eventually paid.
Theorem 3. There exists a cross-chain payment protocol with
weak liveness guarantees.
4 A TIME-BOUNDED PROTOCOL
In Figure 2 we present the protocol from Thm. 1 formalised as an
Asynchronous Network of Timed Automata (ANTA), a specification
formalism introduced in [5]. There is one automaton for each par-
ticipant in the protocol, that is, for each escrow ei (i = 0, . . . ,n−1)
and each customer ci (i = 0, . . . ,n). Each automaton is equipped
with a unique identifier, in this case ei and ci . It has a finite number
of states, depicted as circles, and transitions between them.
Each automaton keeps an internal clock, whose value, a real
number, is stored in the variable now. In case a transition occurs
that is labelled by an assignment x := now, the variable x will
remember the point in time when the transition took place.
An automaton spends a bounded amount of time calculating
in each grey (output) state, and leaves it by performing the action
s(id,m) of sending messagem to participant id . We consider three
kinds ofmessages: (i) certificate χ , signed by Bob, (ii) the value $ that
is transmitted from one participant to another, and (iii) promises
made by escrow ei to its customers ci and ci+1, respectively:
G(d) := “I guarantee that if I receive $ from you at my local timew ,
then I will send you either $ or χ by my local timew + d .”
P(a) := “I promise that if I receive χ from you at my time v , with
v < now +a, then I will send you $ by my local time v + ε .”
When an automaton is in a white (input) state, it stays there
(possibly forever) until one of its outgoing transitions becomes
enabled; in that case that transition will be taken immediately. The
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ei : Escrow i (i = 0, . . . , n−1)
s(ci , G(di ))
r (ci , $)
s(ci+1, P (ai ))
u := now
now ≥ u + ai
r (ci+1, χ )
s(ci , χ )
s(ci+1, $)
s(ci , $)
ci : Customer i (i = 1, . . . , n−1); Chloei
s(ei , $)
r (ei , $)
r (ei , χ )
s(ei−1, χ )
r (ei−1, $)
r (ei−1, P (ai−1))
r (ei , G(di ))
c0 : Customer 0; Alice
r (e0, G(d0)) s(e0, $)
r (e0, $)
r (e0, χ )
cn : Customer n; Bob
r (en−1, P (an−1)) s(en−1, χ ) r (en−1, $)
Figure 2: Automata representing escrows and customers
time-out transition now ≥ u + ai is enabled when this formula
evaluates to true. An input transition r (id,m) is triggered by the
receipt of messagem from the automaton id in the network.
The automata of Figure 2 can be informally described as follows:
An escrow ei first sends promiseG(di ) to its (upstream) customer ci .
Here “upstream” refers to the flow ofmoney. The precise values ofdi
are calculated in [5]; here they are simply parameters in the design
of the protocol. Then it awaits receipt of the money/value from
customer ci . If the money does arrive, the escrow issues promise
P(ai ) to its downstream customer ci+1. It remembers the time this
promise was issued as u. Then it awaits receipt of the certificate χ
from customer ci+1. If χ does not arrive by time u + ai , a time-out
occurs, and the escrow refunds the money to customer ci . If it does
arrive in time, the escrow reacts by forwarding the certificate to
customer ci , and forwarding the money to customer ci+1.
A connector Chloei starts by awaiting promises G(di ) from her
downstream escrow ei , and P(ai−1) from her upstream escrow ei−1.
Then she proceeds by sending the money to escrow ei . After send-
ing the money, Chloei waits for escrow ei to send her either the
certificate χ or the money back. In the latter case, her work is done;
in the former, she forwards the certificate to escrow ei−1 and awaits
for the money to be sent by escrow ei−1. The automata for Alice
and Bob are both simplifications of the one for Chloei .
5 RELATIONWITH CROSS-CHAIN DEALS
In Herlihy, Liskov and Shrira [3], a cross-chain deal is given by a
matrixM whereMi, j is listing an asset to be transferred from party
i to party j. It can also be represented as a directed graph, where
each vertex represents a party, and each arc a transfer; there is
an arc from i to j labelled v iff Mi, j = v , 0. They present two
protocols for implementing such a deal, while aiming to ensure:
• Safety. For every protocol execution, every compliant party
ends up with an acceptable payoff.
• Termination.1 No asset belonging to a compliant party is
escrowed forever.
• Strong liveness. If all parties are compliant and willing to
accept their proposed payoffs, then all transfers happen.
Here a payoff is acceptable to a party i in the deal if party i either
receives all assetsMj,i while parting with all assetsMi, j , or if party
i loses nothing at all; moreover, any outcome where she loses less
and/or gains more then an acceptable outcome is also acceptable.
Each entry Mi, j contains a type of asset and a magnitude—for
instance “5 bitcoins”. For each type of asset a separate blockchain is
assumed that acts as escrow. The programming of these blockchains
is assumed to be open source, so that all parties can convince them-
selves that all escrows abide by the protocol. With this in mind, their
Termination requirement corresponds with ours, while Safety
is the counterpart of our Customer security. Our requirement
of Escrow security is left implicit in [3]; since blockchains do
not possess any assets to start with, they surely cannot lose them.
Finally, their Strong liveness property is the counterpart of ours.
Herlihy, Liskov and Shrira [3] offer a timelock commit protocol
that requires synchrony, and assures all three of the above correct-
ness properties. They also offer a certified blockchain commit pro-
tocol that requires partial synchrony and a certified blockchain, and
ensures Safety and Termination; no protocol can offer Strong
liveness in a partially synchronous environment. For both proto-
cols the correctness is proven for so-called well-formed cross-chain
deals: those whose associated directed graph is strongly connected.
In [5] we show that the cross-chain payment cannot be seen as
a special kind of cross-chain deal, nor vice versa.
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